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John Tomasi: Free market fairness 
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012. 
384 Pages. USD 35.00 (Cloth). 
 
John Thrasher 




John Rawls argued that democratic citizens would rationally choose two principles of 
justice: one defending the value of political liberties and the other dedicated to 
making sure society works to the greatest benefits of the least well off. Almost fifty 
years later, the Rawlsian doctrine is still the orthodoxy in political philosophy. Alfred 
North Whitehead wrote that philosophy is a collection of footnotes to Plato. Similarly, 
contemporary political philosophy is largely a collection of footnotes to Rawls. In Free 
Market Fairness, John Tomasi is attempting to reform the Rawlsian orthodoxy as well 
as to evangelize to the non-believers. He is not overthrowing the old faith as 
reforming and extending it. He argues that political philosophy is divided into two 
main groups: the orthodox Rawlsians and the classical liberal and libertarian non-
believers. Free Market Fairness is an attempt to make a case for why these two liberal 
camps should merge. Orthodox Rawlsians—high liberals (as he calls them)— should 
reform and accept the importance of economic liberties. Classical liberals and 
libertarians should accept the good news of social justice and come into the fold.   
 
Tomasi spends roughly equal time on each project, with different results. Rawlsian 
liberals believe that political liberties are essential to protecting the moral equality of 
citizens. However, They undervalue and ignore the importance of economic liberties 
according to Tomasi. This is a mistake. Tomasi argues that citizens express their 
moral power of, what Tomasi calls “self authorship,” through non-political market 
activity. Economic liberties should be valued and protected as much as political 
liberties and for the same moral reasons. This is a promising and provocative 
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argument, but one that orthodox Rawlsians will resist, for a variety of reasons. 
Tomasi’s arguments are intuitively plausible but are missing important elements. In 
the end we are left with a promising argument that is not fully developed; at least not 
enough to assuage the worries of orthodox Rawlsians.  
 
In the evangelical part of the book, Tomasi attempts to show why classical liberals 
and libertarians should stop worrying and learn to love social justice. Given that 
opposition to social justice virtually defines classical liberals and libertarians, Tomasi 
has a difficult case to make. Tomasi gets off on the wrong foot by arguing classical 
liberals are afflicted with an allergy to social justice, “social justicitis” (p. 151). This 
affliction is characterized by a reflexive and unthinking aversion to social justice. 
Despite this aversion, Tomasi also argues that classical liberals and libertarians are 
committed to endorsing social justice because they already implicitly endorse a 
“distributional adequacy condition.” This condition is the claim that “a system that 
does not work to the benefits of the working poor is defective from a moral point of 
view” (p. 125). According to Tomasi, this amounts to an admission that social justice 
is morally important to classical liberals. He argues, “classical liberals should advocate 
the system of economic liberty because that system advances the interests of all 
citizens, and most notably the interests of the poor…as an expression of their 
commitment to reciprocity” (p. 141).  
 
I will ignore the incongruity of arguing that classical liberals simultaneously are 
afflicted with social justicitis and also endorse social justice. Instead, I will look at the 
substance of his claim that classical liberals all endorse a commitment to a 
distributional adequacy condition. Tomasi is equating some of the benefits of a system 
with its fundamental justification. Classical liberals almost always express a 
humanitarian concern for the poor. The poor will be better off in a market system, 
they argue, because everyone will be better off. It does not follow that markets are 
justified because of this; a benefit is not necessarily a justification. Consider an innocent 
man on trial for murder. The fact that the man is better off if he is acquitted is not a 
justification for acquitting him. The justification for acquitting him is that he is 
innocent. Similarly, many classical liberals distinguished between justice and 
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beneficence. It is unjust to refuse to pay a miser what he is owed even if that money 
could greatly benefit the poor. The humanitarian concern to alleviate suffering is not 
a matter of justice. Justice concerns the claims we can legitimately make on one 
another. To envelop social beneficence into justice is to justify some classes making 
claims of justice—enforced with coercion—on others. This turns the realm of justice 
into an arena where various groups come to compete for a claim on society’s 
resources. In James Buchanan’s term, this is the redistributive state rather than the 
productive and protective state.  
 
The key feature of the classical liberal conception of justice is that the rules should 
apply to all—the rulers and the ruled, the rich and the poor. From the middle of the 
19th and throughout the 20th century, classical liberals often argued that their policies 
would benefit the poor. During that period, classical liberals were competing with 
socialists for the hearts and minds of the public. Socialism makes its appeal to the 
poor and so did the classical liberals. In the 18th and the early 19th century, the 
opponents of the classical liberals were aristocratic elites, mercantilists, and others 
who sought to keep the political system closed so as to benefit from various privileges. 
During this period, classical liberals appealed to those outside the closed, privileged 
circle of the favored elite. In both cases, it was the opponents of the classical liberals 
who argued that social rules should benefit of a particular class. Classical liberals 
argued for the open society, not one that worked specially to the benefit of any 
particular class. Tomasi follows Rawls in arguing that the poor have a special claim 
on the products of their society. He does not justify this claim with any derivation or 
revamped original position; instead he seems to assume the claim is intuitive, but it is 
not. Humanitarian concern is not justice. Classical liberals and classical utilitarians 
argued that each should count for one and no more than one. Tomasi needs to give a 
very compelling argument for why the poor should count for more than one in the 
justificatory calculus. He never makes that difficult case in Free Market Fairness.  
 
Tomasi also takes aim at F.A. Hayek’s argument social justice is a “mirage.” The 
concept of justice, according to Hayek, can only apply to persons, intentions, and 
deliberate design. Markets are spontaneous orders; hence, they are not the type of 
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things that can be just or unjust. Social justice is a “category mistake.” Tomasi replies 
that societies and markets are spontaneous orders that arise from a background of 
rules and institutions. Since these rules are designed, the outcomes of those rules can 
be just or unjust (p. 153). The rules of society are like rules of a game; different rules 
can make the game better or worse. We are responsible for the game that our rules 
produce (p. 154). He concludes, “the commitment to the ideal of a free society as 
spontaneous order is compatible with the affirmation of some external standard of 
holistic evaluation, including a standard that expresses distributional concerns” (p. 
160). He goes further arguing, “social justice, we might say, gives the Great Society its 
point” (p. 160).  
 
Tomasi is, of course, correct that we can and should critically evaluate the rules of our 
society. James Buchanan criticized Hayek’s evolutionary theory because it did not 
seem to allow for critical evaluation of the rules. To say that we can evaluate the rules 
of our society does not commit us to evaluating those rules in terms of the distributive 
outcomes that arise. Classical liberals evaluate the rules of justice on the basis of 
procedural criteria instead of end-state or outcome criteria. Making a particular 
pattern of distributive justice like the difference principle a criterion of evaluating 
rules of justice makes justice depend on society achieving a specific distributive 
outcome. Society becomes a teleological project to achieve that outcome or end. The 
distributive outcome is a super plan that organizes and constrains the micro plans of 
individuals in that society. Rawls attempted to combine procedural and outcome 
criteria, but the outcome criteria tend to overwhelm the procedural concerns. 
Thinking of spontaneous order processes as a tool for generating specific distributive 
outcomes is to misunderstand their value.  
 
In conclusion, I don’t believe that either Tomasi’s reformist or his evangelical mission 
is completely successful. This does not make his project unimportant, however. He is 
right that classical liberals and Rawlsians are increasingly becoming alien to one 
another. Insofar as liberalism has a common aim and common values, a grand 
synthesis of these two views should be possible. Tomasi has not produced that 
synthesis, but this is not a mark against Free Market Fairness. In any true research 
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program, the missteps and failed experiments are just as important—maybe more 
important—than the successes. Tomasi has done us all a service by starting, if not by 
ending, this important conversation. 
 
